Previous research provides rationales for and evidence of a link between house price appreciation and mortgage choice, with higher appreciation associated with higher take-up rates for adjustable-rate mortgages relative to fixed-rate mortgages. Research also finds mortgage interest rates and their underlying components to be important determinants of mortgage financing choices. In this paper we extend the earlier research and show that house price appreciation can have important interactive effects with those other determinants of mortgage financing choices. The analysis focuses on the period from 2000 to 2007, an episode marked by rapid house price appreciation along with a persistent and notable increase in the use of adjustable-rate mortgage financing, including alternative mortgage products. We find that higher house price appreciation dampened the estimated sensitivity of take-up rates among mortgage financing options to the underlying mortgage pricing components. The results, which are especially robust for fixed-rate and adjustable-rate mortgages that are fully amortized, were not driven solely by observations in markets with especially high rates of house price appreciation. Moreover, after taking into account the interactive effects with mortgage pricing components, house price appreciation is estimated to have had relatively little additional effect on take-up rates among mortgage financing options.
Introduction
An important part of the mortgage financing decision is the borrower's selection from among various fixed-rate and adjustable-rate contracts. Previous research consistently finds that mortgage interest rates and their underlying components such as interest rate term premiums and the term structure of expected short-term rates to be related to the take-up rates of among mortgage financing options (see, for example, Dhillon et al. (1987) , Vickery (2007) , Koijen et al. (2009) , Elliehausen and Hwang (2010) , and Krainer (2010) ). Theoretical modeling of mortgage choice and empirical evidence also indicate that house price appreciation can affect borrowers' selections among fixed-rate and adjustable-rate mortgages, with higher appreciation favoring the take-up of adjustable-rate mortgages (see, for example, Elliehausen and Hwang (2010) and Krainer (2010) , Piskorski et al. (2011) ).
We extend the earlier research by showing that house price appreciation can have important interactive effects with mortgage pricing components on borrowers' take-up rates among mortgage financing options. The analysis focuses on the period from 2000 to 2007, an episode marked by rapid house price appreciation in many markets along with a persistent and notable increase in the use of adjustable-rate mortgage financing, including alternative mortgage products. We find that higher house price appreciation dampened the estimated effect of the mortgage pricing components on the probabilities of mortgage choice outcomes. The magnitudes of the dampening effects are estimated to be somewhat larger at higher levels of appreciation.
Moreover, after controlling for the interactive effects, house price appreciation is estimated to have relatively little additional effect on take-up rates among mortgage financing options.
The dampening effects of house price appreciation could be consistent with rational consumer choices or with speculative bubbles associated with the housing boom. With regard to the latter, to the extent there were price bubbles in housing markets in 2000 to 2007 period, the degree of house price appreciation could have affected the relation of traditional determinants of mortgage choice outcomes in general including mortgage pricing components. Shiller (2013) , for example, argues that "the radical shifts in housing prices in recent years were caused mainly by investor-induced speculation." Wheaton and Nechayev (2008) , using cross-section time series data for a sample of 10 metropolitan markets, find that increases in housing demand related to fundamentals such as population, income growth, and the decline in interest rates could not explain the increase in housing prices in the years running up to 2005. Barlevy and Fisher (2011) also present evidence supporting the view that the boom-bust in the housing market was associated with speculative bubbles in housing markets.
Some researchers, on the other hand, question whether there was widespread ex ante misalignment of house prices during the housing boom (Smith and Smith 2006) . However, even without ex ante misalignment of house prices, rapid price gains still could have affected mortgage financing choices through expectations of future appreciation. In this regard, other researchers argue that expectations of rising house prices (and an accompanying discounted probability of sizeable house price declines) rationalize the decisions of borrowers, investors, and intermediaries during the housing boom (Gerardi et al. 2008, and Foote et al. 2012 ). In the context of elevated expectation for house price appreciation, reduced sensitivity of take-up rates among mortgage options to mortgage pricing components that comprise mortgage interest rates could be consistent with rational consumer choice. In particular, previous research indicates that the differences in the expected tenor of mortgage loans is important to the differential effects of mortgage pricing components, with shorter expected tenors favoring adjustable-rate financing relative to fixed-rate mortgage financing (see for example, Campbell and Cocco (2003) ). The prospect for future house price appreciation may have been viewed by some home buyers as providing opportunities for accumulating home equity and potentially refinancing at more favorable terms in a relatively short period of time, reducing the expected tenors of the mortgage loans.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the changes in house prices and mortgage choices during period 2000 to 2007; Section 3 presents a literature review related to mortgage choice; Section 4 discusses empirical methodology used in this study; Section 5 discusses the data used in this study; Section 6 discusses the empirical results; and Section 7 summarizes the main conclusions.
House prices and mortgage choices during the housing boom
House price appreciation in the United States began picking up steam in the second part of the 1990s, after lagging gains in rents in the first part of that decade (Figure 1 ). In the late 1990s and early 2000s the pace of house price appreciation accelerated, with the increase in one national index averaging about 11 percent at an annual rate over the period 2000 through 2003, outpacing gains in rental rates and pushing up price-to-rent ratios. With regard to mortgage choice, in the United States, fixed-rate mortgages traditionally have been the most popular loan choice. For the vast majority of fixed-rate loans, the loan principal is fully amortized (the monthly payment automatically includes both interest and principal repayment). 4 Since the early 1980s, however, the mix of fixed-rate and adjustable-rate mortgages has fluctuated dramatically. 5 Figure 2 shows the long history for the share of adjustable-rate loans from Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Survey along with the adjustable-rate share from the sample drawn from the McDash Analytics data used in this study. 6 For both series, adjustable-rate mortgages regained popularity starting in the early 2000s. The relative popularity of these loans was especially notable in the period when house price appreciation was the most rapid.
There are different types of adjustable-rate mortgages. One main category is loans for which the loan principal is fully amortized. Among fully amortized adjustable-rate mortgages (A-ARM), a basic form is one in which the interest rate on a loan is set as a spread to a reference 2 House price appreciation is based on the CoreLogic house price index for single family homes. 3 House price appreciation is based on zip-code level data from the CoreLogic house price index for single family homes. 4 The overwhelming majority of fixed-rate mortgages involve the payment of interest and principal. In the sample for this study about 98 percent of fixed-rate loan payments included principal and interest and 2 percent allowed interest-only payments for a period of time. 5 U.S. Congress passed the Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act (AMTPA) in 1982, allowing non-federally chartered mortgage lenders to offer adjustable-rate mortgages. Prior to that, lenders were mostly constrained to offer fixed-rate mortgages. The popularity of adjustable-rate mortgages grew over time and peaked in the mid-1990s. In the wake of the housing boom, the share of adjustable-rate mortgages dropped dramatically (see Krainer (2010) and Moench et al. (2010) Other mortgage contracts allow for delaying amortization-that is, back-loading of principal repayment. Such loans have been referred to as alternative mortgage products (AMPs).
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As with A-ARMs, interest rates on AMPs are linked to a reference rate. AMPs include option adjustable-rate mortgages, which allow the borrower to choose among several payment options each month. Those options typically include (1) a minimum payment which keeps the loan current (but with negative amortization of unpaid interest), (2) an interest-only payment, and (3) a payment of principal and interest. 8 Another type of AMP is the interest-only mortgage contracts. As the name indicates, the periodic payments cover only interest charges for a period of time. 
Residential Mortgage Financing Choices
In this this section we review findings in previous studies related to the determinants of mortgage choice. Of particular relevance to this study are the relations of mortgage pricing components and house price appreciation to mortgage choice. The previous literature also highlights various loan and borrower characteristics found to be related to take-up rates among mortgage options. In that regard, a loan feature important for this study is the treatment of amortization of loan principal. As indicated earlier, while principal payments on fixed-rate mortgages predominantly reflect full amortization, adjustable-rate mortgages are differentiated by the extent to which principal re-payment is back-loaded.
Other loan features considered in previous studies of mortgage choice include loan size relative to size limits set by the Government Sponsored Agencies (GSE) and loan size relative to the value of the purchased property. Borrower characteristics investigated in previous research include credit ratings, borrower attitudes toward risk, variability of income, expected cost of default, degree of financial constraint, and borrower mobility (probability of moving or expected mortgage tenor). 10 In the remainder of this section, we review findings from previous research regarding these determinants of mortgage choices.
Mortgage Pricing Components
The empirical literature on mortgage choice finds that components of mortgage loan pricing play a dominant role in mortgage choice. In terms of specific pricing components, much of the literature on mortgage choice considers the interest rates on fixed-rate and adjustable-rate mortgages. More recent refinements in modeling mortgage choice have incorporated the underlying components of mortgage interest rates related to interest rate term premiums, expected short-term rates, and risk compensation.
Exemplary of earlier studies using mortgage interest rates, Brueckner and Follain (1988) , using borrower (loan) level data for the U.S., and Nothaft and Wang (1992) , using aggregated time series data for the U.S. and selected sub-regions, support findings that higher interest rates on fixed-rates mortgages tend to lead to higher shares of adjustable-rate mortgage loans. For the own pricing of adjustable-rate loans, these studies included the difference between interest rates on fixed-rate loans and those on adjustable-rate loans. The findings show that a larger difference favors the choice of adjustable rate mortgages. 11 Subsequent studies using larger data sets covering longer time periods also find a positive relation of the propensity for borrowers to opt for adjustable-rate financing both with the level of interest-rates on fixed-rate loans and the difference between interest rates on fixed-rate and those on adjustable-rate loans (Jones and Miller (1995) , Coulibaly and Li (2009), Krainer (2010) , Moench et al. (2010) Regarding the markup, armz is the average markup reflecting the lender's expected tenor, which may or may not be the same as that of the borrower. The term, ɤz,i, is the difference in the markup for the individual relative to average markup, again reflecting differences in individual market and borrower risk factors. 12 The term premium represents the compensation investors require to have their funds locked up for a longer period instead of being put into a series of shorter-term instruments. 13 In setting the interest rate on a fixed-rate mortgage, expectations regarding the tenor of a loan would be those of the lender, which may or may not coincide the borrowers' expectations.
The difference between interest rates on a fixed-rate and an adjustable-rate loan can be expressed as:
The term premium, TPx, represents the adjustment to the yield on an instrument that investors require to commit to holding a long-term debt instead of a series of shorter-term instruments.
With regard to mortgage financing, the effect of the term premium on probability of borrower selecting a financing option can depend in part on the borrower's expected prepayment (or refinancing) horizon. For example, Campbell and Cocco (2003) show that borrowers with low mobility (longer expected tenors of mortgage loans) prefer fixed-rate financing. For a given distribution of expected prepayment horizons among borrowers, then, a higher term premium would be expected to increase the likelihood that borrowers would opt for adjustable-rate financing.
14 This also consistent with Koijen et al. (2009) , which demonstrates the importance of interest rate term premiums in mortgage choice. Their empirical analysis, using macro-level data as well as loan-level data aggregated over several groupings, provides evidence that higher interest rate term premiums increase the likelihood that borrowers will opt for adjustable-rate financing.
The term structure of short-term rates could affect mortgage choice through at least two different channels. Similar to the term-premium effect, the first is related to potential differences in mobility among borrowers. To the extent the expected tenor (y) of an adjustable-rate mortgages is less than the expected tenor (x) for a fixed-rate mortgage, say, owing to higher mobility a la Campbell and Cocco (2003) , then the term structure of short-term rates could affect a borrower's choice of financing. If interest rates were expected to rise (fall) over time, E(SRx)
would be greater (less) than E(SRy), increasing (decreasing) the propensity of a borrower to opt for adjustable rate financing.
Elliehausen and Hwang (2010) present a model in which the term structure of short-term rates can affect mortgage choice through another channel. In their model, a steeper slope of expected short-term rates tends to increase the current payment on a fixed-rate mortgage more than for a comparable adjustable-rate mortgage. In that model, borrowers are assumed to be less patient than lenders, so that the difference in the payment profile implies a positive relation 14 To the extent that term premiums tend to be positive, this dimension of mortgage pricing also could affect the mortgage financing choice through an initial affordability channel.
between the term structure of short-term interest rates and borrowers' choice of adjustable-rate financing.
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Interest rate volatility also can be relevant to the decomposed difference between interest rates on fixed-rate and adjustable-rate mortgages. Elliehausen and Hwang (2010) argue that higher interest rate risk tends to lead a borrower to opt for fixed-rate financing. Higher interest rate volatility increases expected losses for the lender on adjustable rate mortgages. Accordingly the lender increases the markup on adjustable-rate mortgages due to concern about future defaults owing to borrower "payment shock." This tends to reduce the appeal of adjustable-rate financing for the borrower because the option value of default for the borrower, who is assumed to be less patient, is less than the lender's required adjustment to the markup on an adjustablerate mortgage. Also relevant to the effect of interest rate volatility, Campbell and Cocco (2003) show that borrowers' attitudes toward risk can affect mortgage choice, with more risk-averse borrowers tending to favor fixed-rate financing.
With differences in the treatment of amortization of loan principal, the sensitivity to mortgage pricing components can differ between A-ARMs and AMPs. For example , Brueckner et al. (2015) maintain that the longer expected holding period for AMPs could mean less influence of the term structure of short-term interest rates on that mortgage outcome. The same might hold for the term premium, to the extent that the expected tenors of AMPs are longer.
Also, the Barlevy et al. (2011) model implies that interest-only mortgage would be more prevalent with emerging house price bubbles, which might mean dampened sensitivity of such AMPs to mortgage pricing components more generally in higher house price appreciation markets.
House Price Appreciation
Previous research finds a relation between house price appreciation and the type of mortgage financing. That research indicates that increases in house price appreciation are associated with increases take-up rates of adjustable-rate financing relative to fixed-rate financing, especially for alternative mortgage products. Relevant for adjustable-rate versus fixedrate mortgage choices generally, the Elliehausen and Hwang (2010) model predicts that higher expected house price appreciation should increase the likelihood of a borrower opting for adjustable-rate financing. This result is obtained because higher house prices in the future reduce the expected probability of default on adjustable-rate loans, and thus lowers the markup. The result is supported by their empirical findings for subprime borrowers. In other research, Piskorski et al (2011) argue that mortgages with scheduled interest rate increases such as hybrid adjustable rate mortgages should be prevalent in locations with higher expected house price appreciation. Krainer (2010) presents empirical results indicating that higher house price appreciation is associated with an increases in take-up rates of adjustable-rate financing relative to fixed-rate financing.
In the case of alternative mortgage products, Brueckner, et al. (2015) shows that, when future house-price expectations become more favorable, thus reducing default concerns, mortgage choices shift toward alternative payment products (those with back-loaded prepayment of principal). This prediction is confirmed by their empirical evidence showing that an increase in past house-price appreciation, which they argue captures more favorable expectations for the future, raises the market share of alternative mortgage products. The LaCour-Little, et al. 
Interaction between house price appreciation and interest-rate-related components.
From the previous studies, then, mortgage pricing components and house price appreciation appear to be related to the probabilities of borrowers' selections among financing options. Central to our analysis is how the pace of house price appreciation might alter the consideration borrowers give to interest-rate-related components when choosing the type of mortgage financing. In our analysis we test for such effects by interacting house price appreciation with mortgage pricing components. At issue is whether the sensitivity of the mortgage financing choices to mortgage pricing components diminishes with an increase in the pace of house price appreciation in a market.
One potential factor behind such dampening effects could be a general disconnect with fundamental determinants of mortgage choice owing to housing price bubbles. A second is a reduction in the average expected tenor of mortgages. Regarding this second channel, as noted earlier, while expectations regarding house prices appreciation during the housing boom may have been too optimistic ex post, given those expectations, finding that house price appreciation altered the estimated relationship of mortgage pricing components and mortgage choice still could be consistent with consistent with rational consumer choice. In particular, the implications of borrower mobility in Campbell and Cocco (2013) can apply more generally to the expected tenor of a mortgage. One of the motivations, then, for considering the interactive effects of mortgage pricing components and house price appreciation is the potential for latter to shorten the average expected tenor of mortgages.
To start, it can be noted that, with little or no change in house prices, the expected tenor of a mortgage loan would be tied to expectations such as those related to life-cycle events including illness, retirement, job changes, unemployment, etc. However, that might change to some extent when house prices are rising rapidly. Historically, the past changes in house prices have been good predictors of future changes, so increases in house prices in the first part of the last decade likely fed expectations of further appreciation. The prospects for future appreciation may have been viewed by some borrowers as providing opportunities for accumulating home equity and refinancing at more favorable terms in a few years, even if the borrower did not plan to move. 16 Alternatively, some purchasers looking to "flip" houses in markets with high house price appreciation would have had very short expected loan tenors. In both cases, the expected time to paying off mortgages among borrowers could be shortened in higher house price appreciation markets, leading to higher adjustable-rate mortgage shares for given term premium levels, expected interest rates, and markups.
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Similarly, a higher effective degree of mobility (higher propensity to prepay) among some borrowers in higher house price appreciation markets could alter the effects of interest rate volatility on mortgage choice. A potential channel is a shorter-expected tenor of a mortgage, which would working to reduce the expected length of time of exposure to interest rate fluctuation and, thus, mute the consideration some borrowers would give to interest rate volatility.
Other determinants of Mortgage Choice
The literature on mortgage choice identifies several other factors that can affect the propensities of borrowers to selected different types of mortgage financing. Differences in the degree of risk aversion more generally and the degree of financial constraints for borrowers can be relevant to mortgage financing choices. Campbell and Cocco (2003) They also find empirical evidence that financially constrained borrowers tend to favor adjustable-rate financing. Observable variables that might be indicative of financial constraints consider in previous research are the ratio of initial size of a mortgage loan to the appraised value of the property and the ratio of the price of a property to the borrower's income. Credit constraints also can be expected to be related to a borrower's credit rating.
With regard to A-ARM and AMP outcomes, Cocco (2013) , in a study of UK borrowers, finds AMPs were used by households to lower initial mortgage payments and/or to borrow larger amounts relative to their income-that is, higher loan-to-income ratios-compared to fully amortized adjustable-rate mortgages. Similarly, the flexibility in payments for some AMP loans may reduce the sensitivity to interest rate volatility relative to A-ARMs. In addition, the game theoretic model of mortgage contract choice in LaCour-Little et al. (2010) implies that deferred amortization contracts are more likely to be selected in housing markets with greater expected house price appreciation and by households with greater risk tolerance. That would mean that the propensity to select AMPs might be relatively greater with higher house price appreciation and relatively less sensitive to interest rate volatility and income risk.
Finally, whether a size of a loan conforms to the federal government sponsored enterprises (GSE) size limits may be relevant to mortgage choice. Previous research shows that interest rates on fixed-rate mortgages are lower on loans that conform to those size limits compared to otherwise comparable larger loans (see for example, Passmore et al. 2005 ). In addition, Vickery (2007) shows that the market share of adjustable-rate mortgages discontinuously shifts upwards for loans at the GSE conforming loan limit. 18 The explanation is the shift is due to borrowers responding to a shift in relative interest rates on adjustable-rate compared to fixed-rate loans. It is expected that borrowers able to finance with loans that conforms to GSE size limits would be more likely to choose a fixed-rate mortgage.
Empirical Methodology
We model the mortgage choice decision using a multinomial probit model,
where Ui,m represents the utility for borrower i opting for mortgage choice m. The options for m are three non-ordered choices for mortgage financing: fixed-rate mortgage, adjustable rate mortgage with full amortization-A-ARMs, and alternative mortgage products-AMPs. Mortgage pricing components
• Term premium (TP)
• Expected term structure of short-term interest rates (Term_Str)
• Interest rate volatility (R_Vol)
• Average fixed-rate markup (frm)
18 Vickery and Fuster (2015) address the effect of access to liquid securitization market for non-conforming loans on the share of fixed-rate mortgage among non-conforming loans. 19 The model also was estimated with four non-ordered choices: fixed-rate mortgages, A-ARMs, option adjustablerate mortgages and interest-only adjustable-rate mortgages. The findings from that analysis regarding the effects of mortgage pricing components and the interaction of those components are similar to those present for the estimations based on the three-choice model.
• Average adjustable-rate markup (arm)
Housing market conditions
• House price appreciation (HPI_App)
• Volatility of house price appreciation (HPI_Vol)
Loan and borrower characteristics
• Ratio of loan value to property value (LTV)
• Loan eligibility under GSE loans limits (Conform)
• Borrower credit risk rating (Credit_Risk)
• Purchase price of a property to the borrower's income (Pr_Inc)
The literature review informs the expected coefficient signs. The term premium is expected to be positively related to the propensity of borrowers to select adjustable-rate financing in general relative to fixed-rate loans. The term structure of short-term rates and interest rate volatility are expected to be positively related to the propensity to select A-ARMs, though not necessarily AMP loans, relative to fixed-rate loans.
Regarding loan markups, frm and arm represent averages for the nation and should reflect general credit supply conditions in the mortgage market. The average markups on fixed-rate and adjustable-rate mortgages, respectively, are expected to be positively and negatively related to the propensity of borrowers to select adjustable-rate financing. Note, the net difference from the average markup for a borrower is observable only for the loan selected and not for all the mortgage alternatives considered. That is, for ɛx,i. and ɤz,i, the data for only one or the other (not both) are available for a given borrower (depending on the type of loan selected. Thus, these differences from the average markups are not included in the empirical specification. However, the differences the individual markups for borrowers relative to the average markups should depend on the housing market conditions variables as well as the loan and borrower characteristic included in the empirical analysis.
For housing market conditions, house price appreciation is expected to be positively related to the propensity of borrowers to select adjustable-rate financing relative to fixed-rate financing in general, and AMPs relative to A-ARMs. The central focus of the analysis is the interactive effects of house price appreciation on mortgage pricing components. Based on the early analysis, higher house price appreciation is expected to dampen the estimated sensitivities between mortgage financing choices and the term premium, the term structure of short-term interest rates, interest rate volatility and the risk markups. House price volatility is expected to reduce the relative attractiveness of A-ARMs.
Among the loan and borrower characteristics, the ratio of the loan value to the value of the property purchased and the borrower credit risk rating are expected to be positively related to the propensity of borrowers selecting adjustable-rate mortgages. A loan conforming to GSE loans limits would be expected to favor fixed-rate relative to adjustable-rate financing. A higher ratio of the purchase price of a property to the borrower's income is expected to be positively related to the propensity to select adjustable-rate financing in general and AMPs in particular.
Lastly, for income risk, higher risk is expected to be associated with higher rates of take-up of adjustable-rate financing.
Data
The loan level data used in the empirical analysis are from the McDash Analytics, LLC.
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The related borrower income data are from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
databases. The random sample used in the analysis includes over 2.6 million first-lien, 30-year loans for home purchases by the primary resident. 21 The sample period is from the first quarter of 2000 through the third quarter of 2007. 22 The loans are grouped by interest rate type and treatment of amortization. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. A-ARM represents adjustable rate mortgages that are fully amortized and AMP represents adjustable-rate mortgages that allow back-loading of the re-payment loan principal.
The term premium (TP) is the 10-year term premium measured along the lines of a "ruleof-thumb" estimate used in Koijen et al. (2009) . Specifically, the term premium is the difference between the ten-year Treasury bond constant maturity yield and the three-year average of interest rates on the one-year Treasury bill. The data are averages for the quarter in which a loan was closed. The term structure of expected short-term interest rates (Term_Str) is estimated as the difference between the trailing three-year average of the one-year Treasury rates and the average 20 McDash Analytics, LLC is a fully-owned subsidiary of Black Knight Financial Services, LLC. 21 We view a refinancing decision as different from one to purchase a home. Additional factors, such as the interest rate on the previous loan and the type of previous loan, might be important in mortgage refinance decisions. Thus, we exclude loans taken for refinancing from the sample. 22 The sample period ends in the third quarter 2007 prior the onset of the financial crisis.
of the one-year Treasury rate in the quarter a mortgage is closed (see Koijen et al. (2009) ).
Interest rate volatility (R_Vol) is the quarterly average of the Merrill Lynch Option Volatility
Expectations (MOVE) index.
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The average markup on fixed-rate mortgage (frm) is the difference between quarterly average of the fixed-rate mortgage interest rates from Freddie Mac for 30-year conventional loans and the average of the ten-year Treasury bond constant maturity yields. The average markup for the adjustable rate mortgage (arm) is measured as the difference between the quarterly average of the interest rates for adjustable-rate mortgages (with a one-year Treasury rate as the reference rate) and the quarterly average of the one-year constant maturity Treasury rates.
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For the housing market variables, house price appreciation (HPI_App) is the two-year, percent log change of the CoreLogic house price indexes. The observations are the two-year log change through the month prior to the closing quarter of a loan. The volatility of house price appreciation (HPI_Vol) is the standard deviation of the monthly log changes in CoreLogic house price indexes by zip over the same two year period.
For the loan characteristic, the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) is the original principal of a loan as a percent of the appraised value of a property. 25 LTV applies to the first lien. We noted a concentration of LTV at 80 percent. To qualify for conforming loan without mortgage insurance generally requires a loan-to-value ratio of at least 80 percent on a first lien. A borrower wishing to finance a property with less than a 20 percent down payment might obtain an 80 percent loanto-value first-lien mortgage and also obtain a second mortgage when purchasing a home. To control for the potential that first liens just meeting the 80 percent limit may also involve second mortgages at the time of financing we include a control for loan-to-value ratios on first liens that are exactly 80 percent. The control is LTV80, which equals one if LTV equals 80 percent and zero otherwise. 23 The index measures the implied volatility in U.S. Treasury markets. 24 As noted in the previous section, the actual overall markups faced by each borrower is observable only for the loan selected. 25 Elliehausen and Hwang (2010) present a model in which LTV interacts with the term structure of short-term rates and interest rate volatility. In the context of our specification, the relation of Term_Str and R_Vol to mortgage choice could differ for high versus low LTV loans. Note, however, that the results incorporating the controls for high and low loan-to-value mortgages do not change the conclusions from the analysis.
The variable Conform equals one if the loan amount is less than or equal to the loan limit for GSE qualifying loans and zero otherwise. The credit risk measure, Credit_Risk, is the consumer credit rating from Fair Isaac Credit Organization (FICO). The value of FICO ranges from 300 to 850, and higher FICO represents the lower credit risk of the borrower. Pr_Inc is the ratio of appraised value of a property to a borrowers reported income. The appraisal values are from the McDash Analytics database and the data on borrower income are from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act database. 26 The proxy for income risk, Inc_Risk, is the average county unemployment rate in the closing quarter of a loan.
Empirical Results
This section presents the probit results for the sample of properties in 50 states and the District of Columbia. 27 The estimates are for first-lien mortgages for home purchases. The probit estimations control for year-fixed effects and state-fixed effects. Levels of significance are based on robust standard errors clustered on counties. 28 The probit model is estimated using the full sample and a subsample. The subsample only includes observations for which house price appreciation is less than the 75 th percentile of its sample distribution. The estimation using the subsample is a robustness exercise to determine whether results for the full sample are driven by the observations in markets that experienced especially rapid increases in house prices.
Full Sample
Probit Estimation Table 2 presents probit estimates for first-lien mortgages for home purchases for the full sample. The fixed-rate mortgage choice is the base outcome. The results relating to A-ARMs are presented in the first panel and the results for the AMPs are presented in the second panel. 26 The borrower income data from the HMDA datasets is matched to the McDash Analytics dataset. The matching logic can be found in appendix to Rosen (2011) . All the observations included in the sample are unique two-way matches from the data sources. 27 We also estimated multinomial logit models. Those models generated very similar empirical results. 28 The sample also was filtered to include only loans with original loan-to-value ratios greater than 10 percent and less than 110 percent. Observations with house-price-to-income ratios above the 99 th percentile or below the first percentile were dropped. Observations were excluded if the borrower did not report positive income and for those reporting income in top income code.
For the full sample, the loan and borrower characteristic have the expected signs suggested by studies cited earlier and are statistically significant, with one exception. Consistent with previous research, higher loan-to-value ratios and lower credit risk ratings tend to increase take-up rates for adjustable-rate financing. A higher ratio of house-price-to-income, intended as a measure of potential financial constraints, also is associated with higher take-up rates of adjustable-rate mortgages and lower take-up rates of fixed-rate mortgages.
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Also consistent with earlier cited research, borrowers with mortgage loan values meeting the conforming loan limits set by the GSEs are less likely to select adjustable-rate financing. A higher county unemployment rate, which is included as a proxy for income risk, is associated with a lower propensity to use adjustable-rate financing.
The mortgage pricing components enter on their own and interacted with the house price appreciation in the appropriate housing market (zip code). The coefficients without the interaction relate to the effects on the probability of choosing an adjustable-rate financing relative to the fixed-rate option when house price appreciation is zero. Holding house price appreciation at zero, the coefficients on the mortgage pricing components all have expected signs and are statistically significant for A-ARM outcomes. The corresponding coefficients for AMP outcomes also are statistically significant and with the same signs as for the A-ARM counterparts, with the exception is interest rate volatility. For the coefficients that have the same sign for the two adjustable rate outcomes, the magnitudes of the coefficients are larger for AARMs, indicating A-ARM selections are more sensitive to those mortgage pricing components.
Looking at the individual pricing components, a higher average markups (arm) on adjustable-rate mortgages lowers the probability that a borrower will opt for those mortgages, and a higher average markup (frm) on fixed-rate mortgages increase the likelihood of a borrower selecting an adjustable-rate loan to purchase a house. The other mortgage pricing components also are statistically significant. The coefficients on the term premium (TP) and the term structure of expected short-term rates (Term_Str) are positive for A-ARMs and AMPs.
For interest rate volatility, higher volatility is associated with a lower propensity for borrowers to select A-ARMs, consistent with Campbell and Cocco (2003) and Coulibaly and Li 29 Based on the probit estimates in Table 2 , measured at mean values of right-hand-side variables, a one standard deviation shock to the price-to-income ratio (Pr_Inc) would increase the probability of an AMP outcome by 0.01 and reduce that for a fixed-rate outcome by a same magnitude, with a negligible marginal effect on A-ARM choice. The median price to income ratio in the sample is 2.5 and the standard deviation is 0.98.
(2009), and Elliehausen and Hwang (2010) . In contrast to the A-ARMs results, higher interest rate volatility tends to increase the propensity to select AMPs relative to the fix-rate option. The difference in the results could reflect the flexibility in payments for some AMP loans, which could reduce risk of default and, thus, have less of an impact on the adjustable-rate markup for AMPs than indicated by Elliehausen and Hwang (2010) . The result also is consistent with LaCour-Little et al. (2010) in which deferred amortization contracts are more likely to be selected relative to fully amortized loans by borrowers with greater risk tolerance.
Out of the two housing market condition indicators explored, only house price appreciation is statistically significant. Consistent with previous studies, higher house price appreciation is associated with a higher propensity for borrowers to select adjustable-rate financing relative to the fixed-rate option, with the coefficients for A-ARM and AMP loans of similar magnitude.
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The results in Table 2 that are central to the contribution of this paper are those related to the interaction of house price appreciation and the mortgage pricing components. The results for A-ARMs in Table 2 reject the hypothesis that house price appreciation does not affect the sensitivity of mortgage financing choice to mortgage pricing components. In particular, for each of the statistically significant interactions, the interactive effect (shown in the shaded column) dampens the sensitivity of mortgage choice to the mortgage pricing component.
For AMP loans, the interaction with house price appreciation also tends to dampen the sensitivity of mortgage choice to some of the mortgage pricing components, though less consistently and with less precisely estimated coefficients. One of the interactive effects that is statistically significant and dampens the sensitivity of mortgage choice is that involving the average fixed-rate markup. The coefficients on the interaction of house price appreciation with average adjustable-rate markup and interest rate volatility also indicate an offsetting effect for those two mortgage pricing components for the AMP outcome, though the coefficient on the average adjustable rate is not statistically significant. 30 Since house price appreciation interacts with the mortgage pricing components, the results in Table 2 for house price appreciation are for when those components equal zero. The net effect of house price appreciation on mortgage choice taking into account the interactions is discussed below.
Marginal effects
To assess the magnitude of the effects of the mortgage pricing components and those related to the interaction of house price appreciation on the probability of the three financing choices, marginal effects can be derived from the probit estimation. For the full sample, the marginal effects are presented in Table 3 for each of the mortgage financing choices. In the first column of each panel, the house price appreciation is set to zero and the effects are scaled by the standard deviations of the independent variables for which the marginal effects are computed.
The results in the second column of each panel are the estimates of the marginal effects from the interaction of house price appreciation and the mortgage pricing components. The marginal effects from the interaction are calculated at the sample mean of house price appreciation and scaled by the standard deviation of the variable for which the marginal effect is calculated and the mean of house price appreciation. In the third column of each panel, the net effects are the sum of the effects in the first and second columns.
Comparing the first columns of the panels in Table 3 , the magnitudes of the marginal effects indicate that the mortgage pricing components primarily differentiate between fixed-rate mortgages and A-ARMs. For those two mortgage choices, the marginal effects are economically and statistically significant, of opposite signs, and with similar magnitudes. In the case of the average adjustable-rate markup, for example, with zero house appreciation, a one standard deviation (0.83 percentage points) increase would increase the probability of choosing fixed-rate financing by an estimated 0.17 and reduce the probability of choosing A-ARM financing by that same magnitude. 31 Similarly, in terms of the marginal effects, the average fixed-rate markup and the term structure of short-term interest rates are to be material for the fixed-rate versus A-ARM choices. The marginal effect of interest rate volatility is statistically significant only at the 10 percent level and very small in magnitude.
For the AMP choice, the marginal effects of expected term structure of short-term interest rates are statistically significant and negative, though smaller in magnitude relative to the effects for the A-ARM outcome. 32 The marginal effect of interest rate volatility for the AMP outcome is statistically significant but very small in magnitude. 31 The probability of an individual borrower selecting a particular financing option ranges from zero to one. 32 Note also that the magnitude of the negative marginal effect of expected term structure of short-term interest for the AMP outcome is substantially small than that of the negative marginal effect for the fixed-rate outcome. That is, For the interaction effects, estimates of the marginal effects on the probabilities of selecting the mortgage types related to the interaction of the mortgage pricing components with house price appreciation are reported in the second columns of the panels in Table 3 . As noted, the effects are for one standard deviation changes in the mortgage pricing components at the sample mean of house price appreciation. The results show that, for A-ARMs, higher house price appreciation consistently dampened the sensitivity of the mortgage pricing components. The marginal effects associated with the interactions with house price appreciation are all statistically significant. In addition, the magnitudes are material, ranging from about one-fifth to one-third of the marginal effects when holding house price appreciation at zero.
Most of the offsets from dampening effects from the interactions with house price appreciation for A-ARM outcomes are mirrored by those for fixed-rate mortgages. One exception is interest rate volatility. The marginal effects from house price appreciation increases the sensitivity are positive for fixed-rate mortgage and A-ARM outcomes, amplifying the effect in the case of fixed-rate mortgage and dampen it for A-ARMs. The corresponding reduction in marginal effects is accounted for by the AMP outcome.
The third columns of the panels in Table 3 include the results regarding the new effects of the mortgage pricing components, taking into account the interactions with house price appreciations. Even with the dampening effect of house price appreciation on mortgage choices, the fixed-rate mortgage and A-ARM outcome remained sensitive to mortgage pricing components. On the other hand, AMP outcomes in the full sample are relatively insensitive to the individual pricing components.
To summarize, the results on the marginal effects for the full sample point to three findings. First, mortgage pricing components were significant determinants of fixed-rate mortgages and A-ARM choices, but less so for borrowers selecting AMPs. Second, higher house price appreciation tended to dampen the sensitivity of mortgage choice to mortgage pricing terms, though primarily for fixed-rate mortgages and A-ARMs, rather than AMPs. Third, even with the dampening effect of house price appreciation mortgage choices regarding fixed-rate in the two-way comparison between the fixed-rate outcome and the AMP outcome, an increase in the expected term structure of short-term interest rates reduces the probability of fixed-rate mortgages being selected relative to AMPs, which is indicated by the positive coefficient on the expected term structure of short-term interest rates for the AMP outcome in Table 2. mortgage and A-ARMs remained sensitive to mortgage pricing terms, with AMP outcomes remaining relatively insensitive.
Lower House Price Appreciation Sample
As indicated earlier, the pace house price appreciation varied over time and across markets. This section assess the extent to which results for the full sample were be driven by observations for which house price appreciation was exceptionally high. For the analysis, the probit model specification used for the full sample is estimated using only observation for which house price appreciation is below the 75 th percentile of its sample distributions.
The probit estimation results for the subsample presented in Table 4 are consistent with those reported in Table 2 . The loan and borrower characteristics have the expected signs suggested by studies cited earlier and are statistically significant, with the exception of the measure of income risk which is not statistically significant. For the mortgage pricing components, when holding house price appreciation at zero, the coefficients are statistically significant for A-ARMs and for AMPs, with the same signs are for the full sample. The results for house price appreciation for the subsample also are in line with those for full sample.
Regarding the interaction of house price appreciation with the mortgage pricing components, for A-ARM outcome, the interactive effects are statistically significant and tend to dampen the sensitivity of mortgage choice to the mortgage pricing component. However, in Table 4 the magnitudes of the coefficients on the interaction terms tend to be smaller and estimated less precisely compared to the results for full sample. For AMP loans, only the coefficient on the interaction with house price appreciation and the average fixed-rate markup is statistically significant.
The marginal effects of the mortgage pricing components for the subsample are reported in Table 5 . For the lower house price appreciation sample, the mortgage pricing components primarily differentiate between fixed-rate mortgages and A-ARMs, similar to the results for full sample. Again, for fixed-rate mortgage and A-ARM choices, the marginal effects are statistically significant, of opposite signs, and with similar magnitudes. However, the magnitudes of the dampening effects from the interaction of house price appreciation with the mortgage pricing components, with a range from about one-tenth to about one-fourth of the marginal effects when holding house price appreciation at zero, are smaller relative to those for the full sample results. 33 For AMPs, only the marginal effect of the interaction of house price appreciation with the average fixed-rate markup indicates a statistically significant, though small, dampening effect.
The results for the subsample indicate that findings for full sample results are not driven solely by the observations in markets with exceptionally high rates of house price appreciation.
In particular, for the subsample, the dampening effects related to the interaction of house price appreciation with the mortgage pricing component were statistically significant for the fixed-rate mortgage and A-ARM outcomes. However, the results for the two samples do indicate that the observations for the markets with exceptionally higher house price appreciation tend to accentuated to some extent the dampening effects from the interactions with house price appreciations on the sensitivity of mortgage choices to mortgage pricing components.
House Price Appreciation
This section focus on the effects house price appreciation itself, with and without interactions with the mortgage pricing components. Consistent with previous research, the probit estimates reported in Table 2 and Table 4 indicate that higher house price appreciation is associated with higher take-up rates of adjustable rate financing. In the tables the coefficients on house price appreciation are statistically significant and similar in magnitude for A-ARM and AMP outcomes. Those estimates, however do not take into account the interactions of house price appreciation with the mortgage pricing components. The results discussed in this section
show that, when the interactions are taken take into account, it turns out that house price appreciation had relatively little additional effect on the mortgage financing choices.
The marginal effects of house price appreciation on the probabilities of the three financing choices are presented Table 6 . In the first panel of the table, the marginal effects are derived from the probit estimation results presented in Table 2 and are evaluated at the mean of house price appreciation for the full sample. In the second panel, the marginal effects are derived from the probit estimation results presented in Table 4 and are evaluated at the mean of house price appreciation for the observations below the 75th percentile of the variable.
The first column of each panel shows the marginal effect with the mortgage pricing components set to zero and scaled by the standard deviation of house price appreciation for respective sample. In both panels, house price appreciation has statistically significant effects on the mortgage choice outcomes. In the first panel, for the full some, a one standard deviation increase in house price appreciation would reduce the probability of a fixed-rate outcome by 0.16, with corresponding increase of 0.07 and 0.09 for A-ARM and AMP outcomes, respectively. In the second panel, the negative marginal effects of house price appreciation on the fixed-rate outcome are still notable, though about half the magnitude of the effect in the first panel. For the adjustable-rate outcomes, the marginal effects in the first column of the second panel are about equal.
The second column of each panel of Table 6 reports the estimates of the remaining marginal effects of house price appreciation of mortgage choice outcome after taking into account the interactions with the mortgage price components. Again the marginal effects are scaled by the standard deviation of house price appreciation for the respective samples. In the table, the remaining marginal effects are statistically significant for the fixed-rate and A-ARM outcomes for the full sample, but only for A-ARM outcomes for the sample with observations for which house price appreciation is below the 75th percentile of its distribution. However, in both panels, the remaining marginal effects of house price appreciation taking into account the interaction with the mortgage pricing components is quite small. Those results indicate that nearly all of the marginal effects on mortgage choice outcomes associated with house prices appreciation can be accounted for by dampening effects of appreciation on the sensitivities of mortgage choice outcomes to the mortgage pricing components.
Conclusion
This study examines the interactive effect of house price appreciation and mortgage pricing components on mortgage choice. The focus is on the period from 2000 to 2007, an episode marked by rapid house price appreciation along with a persistent and notable increase in the use of adjustable-rate mortgage financing, including alternative mortgage products. The analysis considers three non-ordered choices: fixed-rate mortgages, fully amortized adjustable rate mortgages (A-ARM), and adjustable rate mortgages that back-load of the repayment of loan principal. The latter includes option (payment) and interest-only adjustable-rate mortgages, or so-called alternative mortgage payments (AMP).
The analysis confirms previous research findings that higher house price appreciation is associated with significantly higher take-up rates of adjustable-rate financing. The analysis also
shows that mortgage pricing components such as interest rate term premiums, the term structure of expected short-term rates, and markups are important determinants of mortgage borrowers' financing choices. In particular, mortgage pricing components primarily differentiate between fixed-rate mortgages and A-ARMs, with AMP outcomes showing little sensitivity to the pricing components.
Going beyond the previous research, the analysis in this study highlights two key findings. First, central to our analysis is how the pace of house price appreciation might alter the consideration borrowers give to interest-rate-related components when choosing the type of mortgage financing. The empirical analysis shows that higher house price appreciation is associated with a statistically significant and material dampening effects on the sensitivity of mortgage choice to mortgage pricing terms. The results, which are especially robust for fixedrate and adjustable-rate outcomes that are fully amortized, are not driven solely by observations in markets with especially high rates of house price appreciation. The latter, however, did accentuate to some extent the dampening effects.
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Taking into account the interaction effects also is potentially important to assessing the nature of the effects of house price appreciation on mortgage choice. In particular, the second finding highlighted in the paper is that nearly all of the marginal effects of house price appreciation on mortgage choice outcomes can be accounted for by dampening effects of appreciation on the sensitivities of mortgage choice outcomes to the mortgage pricing 34 As discussed in the study, the dampening effects of house price appreciation could be consistent with the housing boom being associated with speculative bubbles. To the extent there were price bubbles in housing markets in 2000 to 2007 period, the degree of house price appreciation could have affected the sensitivity of mortgage choices to traditional determinants of mortgage choice including mortgage pricing components. However, the estimated effects of the interactions of house price appreciation on the sensitivity of mortgage choice to the pricing components also could be consistent with rational consumer choice in an environment of rising house prices. In this regard, previous research indicates that the differences in the expected tenor of mortgage loans is important to the differential effects of mortgage pricing components, with shorter expected tenors favoring adjustable-rate financing, in particular AARMs, over fixed-rate mortgage financing. The prospects for future house price appreciation may have been viewed by some borrowers as providing opportunities for accumulating home equity and potentially refinancing at more favorable terms in a relatively short period of time, reducing the expected tenors of the mortgage loans.
components. That is, after taking into account the interactive effects with mortgage pricing components, house price appreciation is estimated to have had relatively little additional effect on the mortgage financing choices.
